Much of the recent literature on oligopoly price determination has drawn on Cowling and Waterson's (1976) seminal work. Their contribution w~s to show that ~ general oligopoly model could be used to motivate cross-sectional studies of industry price-cost margins, employing the Herfindahl-Hirschman (H) index of concentration, the conjectural variation, and demand elasticity. More recently, Clarke and Davies (1982) have shown" that the H index is an implication of cost asymmetries, and they propose to parameterize a range of noncompetitive behavior among firms in a Cowling-Waterson type model. The present paper is an effort to take that exercise an additional step forward.
In particular, we draw on insights from recent empirical literature to further generalize these oligopoly models, test some of the distinctive features of each, and explore some new implications using data far more disaggregated than previously available. The relevant empirical developments are found in Kwoka (1979) and Ravenscraft (1983) . The former work examined the role of individual market shares, rather than concentration, in raising industry margins, and found the possibility of procompetitive rivalry by smaller firms.
Ravenscraft uses Federal Trade Commission Line of
Business data to demonstrate the powerful effects of a firm's own share and scale economies, and the curious negative effect of fourfirm concentration, on line of business operating income.
This study uses market shares to respecify the firm interaction parameter in the theoretical model, thereby broadening the range of estimable behavior. Then empirical evidence is developed which reveals a complex set of effects involving other firms' shares in performance determination, and offers an explanation for the anomalous results involving a negative effect of concentration. Among the important specific results, we find that leading firms' margins in each industry are lower when non-leaders are larger, and non-leaders' margins are diminished in industries where scale economies dictate more dominant leading firms. Despite exceptions, the pervasiveness of this rivalry phenomenon contradicts the traditional presumption that performance levels are shared by all firms in an industry. To that extent, the results are in the spirit of Demsetz's (1973) and Porter's (1979) findings. Further implications of these results for the theoretical model and empirical work are discussed in the last section.
I.

Cooperation Models
In this section, we contrast three major approaches to modeling cooperation/collusion: Cowling-Waterson, Clarke-Davies and the "shared asset" model. Our detailed data, described below, permit testing among these alternatives. The results of this testing also constitute the point of departure for the generalization, discussed in the next section, which allows rivalrous behavior among firms.
Cowling and Waterson developed an explicit theory of price determination in an industry j with a constant number of firms (Nj)' a homogeneous product price (Pj), and constant marginal costs (Cij).
The subscript i permits each firm to have a different constant marginal cost curve. In fact, differences in marginal costs are the sole cause for intraindustry differences in firm size, with larger firms having lower marginal cost. Firm profit (or in th8 case of a diversified firm, line of business profit) is defined as TIij = PjXijCijXij. Maximizing profits with respect to own output (Xij) yields:
The Lerner index can be derived from equation (1) From the definition of Aij' it is straightforward to show that:
Since a j represents the degree of industry-wide cooperation, it is na t ural to re presen t aj as an increasing func t ion 0 f concen t ra t ion C j . ~gain assuming this function is linear and substituting it and (4) into (2) yields: 3
Both the Cowling and Waterson model and the Clarke and Davis adaptation involve some strong assumptions which yield very restric-tive specifications. For example, they assume a static environment with a fixed number of firms, a homogeneous product, constant marginal costs and an exogenously determined conjectural variation. 4 A more traditional approach to oligopoly modeling, which has been called the "shared asset" model, acknowledges the difficulty of explicitly specifying the correct functional form and elects a more direct but less rigorous path. It assumes that all firms share in the higher price that results from cooperation. Therefore, profits are assumed to be some positive function of industry-wide concentration. As with the previous models, the functional form is assumed to be linear.5
Market share is also included to capture scale economies and other possible size-related advantages. Hence, the Lerner index of the ith firm in the jth industry is:
While the role of demand elasticity is acknowledged in this model, no specific interpretation along those lines is given to the estimated coefficients in (6).
Equations (3), (5) and (6) therefore represent three related but different models of oligopoly pricing. They also can be viewed as subsets of the following equation:
All three theories suggest that 6 1 will be positive. In addition, The results are reported in Table 1 . Equation (1) of that table is essentially the model in text equation (7). The positive and significant coefficient on MSij is consistent with the theoretical prediction of all three models. Its magnitude suggests an average elasticity of demand between three and six, a more elastic estimate than is commonly observed.
The shared asset theory predicts ~ positive effect of concentration, whereas the regression results reveal a very strong negative association. This theory does, however, appear to be correct in assuming that CR4j MS ij is not important. The individual t statistic on this variables coefficient is insignificant and an F test reveals that equation (2) in Table 1 , which omits the interaction variable,
is not significantly different from equation (1).
The Cowling-Waterson model predicts no effect from the linear term CR4 j , whereas it is always significant. Further, the general equation loses significant explanatory power when CR4j is dropped, as the F test for equation (3) demonstrates. The t statistic on CR4j MS ij is substantially higher in equation (3) than equation (1), suggesting that this interaction term acts as a proxy for the omitted linear concentration term.
Lastly, in addition to a positive effect on MS ij , the ClarkeDavies model predicts equality (in absolute value) of the coefficients on concentration and the concentration-share interaction .
• Imposing such a constraint, in equation (4) Given these results, we proceed to use the Clarke-Davies model to develop further theoretical extensions and conduct empirical tests, with the knowledge that the intuitive shared asset approach is likely to yield similar conclusions. 8
II. Models of Rivalry
The above results support the Clarke-Davies model with one major exception --the coefficient which estimates the degree of cooperation is negative. 9 To further understand this apparent anomaly, two assumptions employed by Clarke-Davies are relaxed.
First, single summary indexes of market structure, such as the four-firm concentration index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, are generalized to allow for the possibility of intraindustry rivalry.
Second, the assumption that the aj's are identical for all firms in an industry is dropped. These changes yield significant insights into the interpretation of the negative coefficient on concentration.
Clarke and Davies offer no theory of oligopoly in the sense of deriving the structural determinants of aj (or more directly, of ~ij).
While most research has used the four-firm concentration ratio, they --like Cowling and Waterson before them --prefer the Y index, but for reasons that lay outside their theory. As Kwoka has noted, such summary indexes of market structure impose a variety of restrictions on the role of individual market shares and, by implication, on interfirm behavior. For example, the four-firm concentration ratio adds up the top four market shares with equal weight, and ignores all other firms. Empirical evidence in Kwoka and in Lamm (1981) rejects these assumptions, and instead finds unequal weights --positive on the top two or three shares, followed by a negatively-signed share.
This latter result is interpreted as possibly reflecting procompetitive rivalry by third -or fourth -ranked firms, since when such firms are large, industry margins decline. The H index weights each firm by itself, and then takes the summation of those terms. That process, too, embodies assumptions. In particular, it precludes the possibility of a negative, rivalry effect from any firm.
Thus, our first modification will be to relax to some degree these restrictions by letting industry-wide <::tj be a simple, linear function of the ordered sequence of market shares in that industry.
That is: That expression assumes identical interactions for all firms with respect to one other, whereas a number of oligopoly theories (dominant firm, price leadership, limit pricing, "strategic groups") would suggest important differences between leading and nonleading firms.
We shall test empirically for such differences in aj'S between leaders and followers, along the lines suggested by Clarke and Davies.
Furthermore, the role played by leaders can be expected to differ depending on a number of factors conditioning the firms'
environments. Prominent among these in the literature is the degree of scale economies. When economies are great, the price preferences of large leading firms may compress non-leaders' price-cost margins since the latter suffer cost disadvantages. By contrast, in lowscale industries, larger leaders are likely to have a less adverse effect on non-leaders' margins, cet. ~ For these reasons, too, the aj'S are predicted to be different, and we shall examine differences between high and low-scale industries.
III. Empirical Evidence
We begin by first exploring the simplest case where the aj,s are identical for all firms in an industry, but a j depends on k shares according to equation (8).
To illustrate the implications, let k = 2, i.e., only S1 and S2 are important to cooperation or rivalry.
Then aj = S1S1j + S2S2j and substituting into (6), we obtain:
where Cij is a random disturbance term and X represents the vector of control variables discussed above. From theory and earlier work it is apparent that we must include own share MSij plus a term interacting S1 j with one-minuS-MSij. The cooperation hypothesis implies that &t > 0; rivalry, that 6 1 < 0; and "independent" behavior, that 61 = O. In fact, our estimation procedure involves first the examination of the effect of S1j by itself (in the form specified by the Clarke-Davies model, i.e., interacted with one minus market share).
Next, S2j is added to the equation with S1j, then S3j is added, and so forth, as long as s ignifican t (posi t i ve or nega t i ve) e ffec ts emerge.
Thus, we will be performing two-tail tests on ordered sequence of 6's. Table II reports estimates of equation (9) In addition, the industry advertising and capital intensity variables fail to achieve statistical significance.
The coefficient on S1DMS ij is negative and significant implying that larger leading firms generally lower LB margins. The estimated coefficients on S2DMS ij and S3DMSij are neither stable in sign nor anywhere near conventional levels of statistical significance.
S4D"1S· . lJ is positive bu~ also insignificant. The F statistic on S2DMSij and S3DMSij taken together is 0.09, far below the 5 percent F value of 3.00. The addition of S4DMS ij to this group raises the F statistic slightly to 0.27, but still well below the critical F value of 2.60. The market shares of nonleading firms do not, in general, seem to affect the price-cost margins of firms in the industry, while the leading firm acts as a strong rival to the smaller firms. Thus, it is the negative effect of S1 which underlies and explains the negative impact of CR4 observed in Table I .
Further insight can be gained by dropping the assumption of identical ~'s for all firms in each industry. As noted in the previous section, reasons exist to believe that leaders and followers in a market are subject to different forces and behave differently.
Since the overall sample of LBs is dominated numerically by followers, their behavior dominates the statistical results. That is, followers may be worse off in markets with larger leaders, even while they are better off with larger own share. By contrast, it is not plausible that leaders are somehow worse off with larger shares.
Thus, in accordance with the second modification proposed in Section II, the sample is split into leader firms and follower firms, industry by industry, so as to permit different ct j IS. Clearly, such splitting has elements of arbitrariness. Three different definitions of a "leader" were explored: (1) the single largest firm in each industry: (2) the largest firm in each industry plus any secondranked firms with shares greater that 15 percent and greater than one-half the corresponding top-ranked firm; and (3) the largest firm in each industry only if its share exceeded 10 percent. Since no radical differences emerge in the results under either the broader or narrower definitions, the first definition was adopted as most straightforward and least arbitrary.
Under this definition, the empirical results on the leader sample are presented in Table III . This model is entirely analogous to that in Table II , with the proviso that MS ij now captures the leader's own share directly. The results, however, are quite distinct. The crucial difference, in terms of the cooperation-rivalry theory, is the change in sign and significance of SlDMSij and S2DMS ij . The coefficient on SlDMSijwas negative and significant in Table II while it is positive and insignificant in Table III . This confirms the proposition that leaders are not lowering their own profitability through their rivalrous behavior. The coefficient on S2DMS ij , which was insignificant in Table II , has a large significantly negative impact in Table III . A large second firm appears, on average, to induce rivalry with leaders rather than cooperation. In both Table II and Table III , more distant rivals seem to have little impact, with t-values on S3DMSij and S4DMSij well below unity. The practical importance of these results would seem to be the lack of evidence of general cooperation or collusion by other firms with the leader.
In Table III, 
IV. Summary
The fact that market shares, both own and others', play compli- These results help interpret some previous findings in the literature. The negative coefficient on four-firm concentration often found (see Rav~nscraft (1983) and Mueller (1983) ) in individual firm or LB regressions may be due to the mixing of models: Leaders are fewer than followers in most samples, and the latter are disadvantaged by larger leading fir~s, whose shares are highly corr~lated with CR4. Similarly, the positive sign of S1's coefficient in indus-try regressions (see Kwoka (1979) and Lamm (1981) ) may be due to aggregation: Larger leading firms comprise more of the weighted average industry price-cost margin. Hence, the positive effect of S1 j on leaders' margins and in general the positive impact of own share will be propagated to the industry level.
Finally, the results have methodological implications. The data have permitted straightforward tests of three models of oligopoly pricing --Cowling and Waterson, Clarke and Davies and shared asset.
All three models result in a negative coefficient on concentration and only the Cowling and Waterson was statistically different from a more general model of oligopoly. We have also noted several limitations of the models. In particular, these models need to incorporate dynamic influences, product differentiation and nonshare related factors which influence cooperation. Even at present, however, the data have illuminated both modeling and empirical issues.
Footnotes 1Cowling and Waterson's aggregation of (3) gives industry margins as: Lj = Hj( 1 + )1j)/llj where )1j = f AijXij2/~Xij2.
1.
Thus even before introducing H as a measure of oligopoly behavior (Ai' or )10), H appears solely as the result of different market shares.
Market sh~res are in turn the result of cost asymmetries among firms.
While Cowling and Waterson's model has often been interpreted as a theoretical justification for using H to represent cooperation, that is not a correct interpretation of the above result. See Clarke and Davies (1982, p. 278) .
2It follows that:
This is also the measure of cooperation proposed by Dickson (1982) and Long (1982) .
3Note, substituting only equation (4) into (2) Thus, there appears to be a contradiction in this model. This problem is similar to the case of a monopolist with two constant marginal costs plants. The solution is for the most efficient plant (or firm) to produce all the output. In general, with nonidentical costs, collusive equilibrium in a conjectural variation model may require negative outputs from high-cost firms and side payments~ It is true, however, that except for close approximations to cooperation (ctj = 1) with dramatically different costs, the model encounters no such problems and on that basis we proceed. We thank the referee for this insight and Bill Long for helpful discussions.
4S ome of the assumptions have been made less restrictive in recent work by Clarke, Davies, and Waterson (1984) and Long (1982) . 5Initial work explored several nonlinear specifications including discontinuous concentration ratios and a squared concentration term. The discontinuous concentration ratios resulted in signs and significance levels similar to the linear concentration variables. Furthermore, neither the nonlinear nor the discontinuous terms added any significant explanatory power to the linear term regressions. 7Most of these variables appear in Ravenscraft (1983) . The import variable comes from Benvignati (1984) . Except for the capa-city utilization variable, industry rather than LB-level versiuns of the variables are employed. Ravenscraft's results suggests that for many variables the industry intensity values better characterizes the context within which each line-of-business operates.
8In fact, all of the equations presented in the paper have been run using the shared asset model and for all these runs the qualitative results were similar to the Clarke-Davies model. 9Daskin (1983) argues that concentration's coefficient may be biased downward because of the omitted demand elasticity. Long and Ravenscraft (1984) , however, present evidence which contradicts this cIa:
10A similar procedure was used to generalize the H index. 2
Specifically, individual coefficients were estimated for each sm d ovariable. This disaggregation of the H index yielded similar, b t statistically weaker, results relative to those in Table 1 .
11The idea that the Cournot solution represents the lower bound has gained credibility more from repetition than from economic theory or empirical evidence. The supposed analogy to "competitive independence" is fallacious. For example, with identical firms the competitive solution is Aj = -1/(Nj-1), not zero. Equation (7) This latter result suggests that equation (7) should not contain a constant term.
We acknowledge a referee's assistance for this last poin1
12Note, when the control variables are omitted, MS i ° becomes significantly positiv~ a~do the t-statistic on S1DMSij indreases to 1.42. The slgn and slgnlflcance of S2DMS ij and MESj remain the same.
13See Connor et. al. (1985) for a review of these studies.
14That is, the 258 industries were divided in two using the median value of MESj. This naturally leads to a moderately unequal number of LB observations in the top and bottom halves of the MES distribution, since there will tend to be fewer firms in the high MES industries. 15The negative coefficient on S1DMS i ° in the high MES sample stems mainly from the producer goods indu~try subsample. The coefficient on S1DMS ij is positive in high MES consumer and Food and ~indred product goods industries. In low MES industries, the coefficient on S1D~Sij is positive for producer and Food and Kindred product groups and negative for consumer goods industries. Note, the only estimated subsample for which no rivalry is observed is Food and ~indred product group. However, in all cases the coefficient on S1DMS ij is insignificant. On the other hand, MSi.i is positive and signiflcant for all subgroups, except low MES proCucer goods and high ~ES rood and Kindred products industries.
16~ variable measuring firm rank was added to the regression in Table II equation (2). Its inclusion did not significantly increase the regression's explanatory power. Also includes nine other control variables (including a constant term).
The regression statistics for these variables are *~ntained in Table II .
Th~ F statistic is a test of the linear restrictions imposed in equations (2), (3) and (4). 
